16 aprile 2020
NOT ALL THAT GLITTERS IS GOLD: TRACING AND COVID-19
A critical voice from Germany
Picture: Nicolò Maraz
ITALIAN VERSION OF THE ARTICLE AVAILABLE HERE
VERSIONE ITALIANA DELL’ARTICOLO DISPONIBILE QUI
In Germany, May 4th is the date when the current lockdown may be eased. For this to not result in a second wave of infections, politicians and scientists have been researching the opportunities for digital tracing methods. Employing such technologies, to many, seemed unimaginable only a few weeks ago but might now become reality as politicians claim that digital tracing via smartphone apps will be the fastest and most efficient way to return to normality. The latter, however, also works as substantial leverage the government exerts as an argument in favour of the app. This is why, although trust levels for the state have risen significantly since the beginning of the crisis, Germans should remain cautious not to adopt tracing apps without a healthy level of doubt, not to say resistance. The question on whether to install a tracing app encompasses much more than finding some extra storage on our phones.
After an initial attempt to track mobile phone data via GPS, put forward by Minister of Health Jens Spahn in late March, received heavy backlash, the German government now embraces an alternative strategy that relies more on individual autonomy, information and independence. This could entail the introduction of a voluntary Bluetooth tracing app to control the spread of COVID-19 in the coming months.
Yet, the fact that only due to public pressures and political contestation Spahn has shifted away from mobile tracking does not necessarily mean that new ideas will be better. Negotiating how far individual human rights concerns can be sacrificed for epidemic control is now central to democratic governance and seen to put to the test the level of trust citizens place on the state.
About two weeks ago, the Robert Koch Institut (RKI), the national disease control centre, released an application for smart watches and fitness bracelets to supplement national tracing efforts and possibly identify boundaries when it comes to using digital technology against COVID-19. The app is said to ‘donate’ anonymised data about personal health conditions to national research.
The app was downloaded more than 100,000 times within a few days, seeming like a success for both researchers and proponents of digital epidemic control technology. However, giving it a closer look, reviews of the app are often poor, with many criticising they had to share their postal code and reporting the app’s code not being open source, which makes it impossible to check on the safety of personal data. The initial image might thus be slightly skewed and not give comprehensive insight into whether tracing apps will be broadly accepted in Germany.
Yet, the question that really needs to be asked is whether it is an opportunity or mistake to use the current crisis to open up to tracing technology. It seems as if Germans are urged to make a decision which they have not been prepared for over the last decades, and are not now. Obviously, no one was prepared for this whole crisis and all its derivatives, but digital education has long been poor in Germany, including knowledge levels about the workings, limits and possibilities of digital data protection and privacy.
All kinds of surveillance mechanisms and digitalisation of certain processes have long been a delicate topic among Germans. The sense of tech-scepticism stands against the background of a dark, complex and very particular history, possibly making the sharing of personal data more contested than in some other European countries. Keeping this in mind, no crisis should justify premature choices about fundamental matters such as exchanging an ease of the lockdown for less digital privacy.
While some think that German, rather conservative, perspectives on digitalisation and privacy rights are out of date and ready to be left behind, others claim they may now be more important than ever with corporations such as Google and Facebook lurking behind every corner. Thus, acceptance even for a voluntary, anonymised, ‘corona tracing’ app is not a sure-fire-success in Germany.
Of course, it is a provocative insinuation to claim that the German government and RKI consciously intend to exploit the desperation of citizens to install a new surveillance tool. For this to happen, German democracy, political activism and awareness may be too well established. Yet, it is not certain who else’s interests are built in into the proposed app and for whom and in what ways data might be or soon become accessible. In Germany, tracing is a big deal and it should continue to be treated as such.
At this point, it might be useful to have a closer look at the very subject of discussion. Contact tracing is much different from mobile phone tracking as it is discussed for instance in Italy, and which was initially suggested by Jens Spahn. A voluntary tracing app using abstract and randomly changing ID pseudonyms would focus on stopping anonymous infection chains only rather than creating personalised movement profiles through mobile phone data. Using Bluetooth and infrared technology, the app could notify individuals who happened to be in close proximity to someone tested positive for COVID-19 during their infectious phase, without relying on or accessing GPS locations. This could take some workload off health authorities who have been calling up contacts of infected people manually and often with a large time lag, which the app is thought to minimise.
In-line with Linus Neumann, spokesman of Chaos Computer Club (the largest European hackers association) many have raised questions concerning the app’s practicality, wondering how exactly data will be transferred once someone is tested positive without sharing too much about their identity and personal network.
Moreover, if people have to inform the app about their own status independently, who would control this? How much scope does it leave for spreading misinformation? How will people be protected against Bluetooth hacking? And, most importantly, to what degree can participation really be voluntary, considering social and economic pressures? For example, what if shop owners made having dowloaded the app a necessary condition for entering their shop? It is questionable whether we could then still speak of a voluntary app – including the consequences this might have for usage and cooperation levels.
Ulrich Kerber, in charge of the German privacy regulatory instance, has repeatedly stressed why this reliance on voluntary cooperation is important: he is certain that a mandatory app will make participation levels and consent drop dramatically. Negotiating how far individual human rights can be sacrificed for most efficient epidemic control is now central to democratic governance and is seen to put to the test the level of trust citizens place on the state.
According to a recent survey, 47% of Germans would be willing to install and use the tracing app, which is below the threshold of 60-70% of installations needed for the app for to be effective. While 47% still is an impressive count in favour of the app, about 45% of survey participants currently actively reject using the app, where a majority is concerned about their privacy rights, amongst concerns about the effectivity and handiness of the digital application.
Many, it seems, perceive an app of such kind as the first step into a surveillance state, comparing it to similar apps used in Israel to trace terrorist organisations. On April 11, Klaus Müller, president of the German Consumer Alliance has stressed that the use of an app is only acceptable if it is proportionate to the current situation, voluntary, effective and, most importantly, active for a limited time only.
Further, the Forum for IT specialists for Peace and Social Responsibility stated that it is not clear how effective tracing apps will be. Thus, as far as plans for the app go, uncertain benefit to control the virus meets uncertain risk to consumer privacy rights. According to them, the government plans tap into a neoliberal ‘fetish for technological solutions’ which, however, may lead to disproportionate measures. They conclude government efforts should prioritise the distribution of masks and extension of testing capacities for COVID-19 over the conceptualisation of a “magical” corona app. Although this expert opinion might draw a very dark picture of current developments, the details and exact functioning for an app need much closer attention and transparency.
This is not to say that tracing technology per se is evil, but the way it is being brought to attention creates a questionable base for decision-making. To say the least, Germans now have to be cautious to not throw away established convictions due to a perceived climate of urgency and panic. If not technically, then mentally, rushing into uncertain territory with tracing apps can lay the foundation for more rigorous and far-reaching interventions by governments, research and corporations in the future.
An advertising and information campaign concerning the app has been planned by the German government. The quality of this information campaign will be central to making a decision about downloading the application, and how to judge the discourse surrounding it.
The proposed app is currently being tested among a small batch of Bundeswehr soldiers. Results from this trial and the transparency and dedication accredited to data protection and privacy rights may be decisive for whether a tracing app will be successful in Germany. Hopefully, this will provoke new political debates in all households, bringing about a re-politicisation of epidemic control and state-public relations. Even if a sufficient majority of Germans were to install the app, a search for safer alternative disease control mechanisms should not be abandoned, but taken forward with the same sense of urgency as they are now.
Lisa Pier
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